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Neutral But Not Isolated: 
Adapting Irish Defense Policy to a Changing Europe 
Ryan Johnson 
 
 
All the world owes much to the little “five feet high” nations.  The greatest 
art of the world was the work of little nations. The most enduring literature 
of the world came from little nations.  The heroic deeds that thrill 
humanity through generations were the deeds of little nations fighting for 
their freedom.  And, oh yes, the salvation of mankind came through a little 
nation. 
  - John F. Kennedy, addressing the Oireachtas on June 28, 1963 
 
Introduction 
International relations between states have changed dramatically in the last half of 
the 20th century.  No longer are single states the sole architects of foreign and economic 
international policy.  Rather, multilateral organizations such as the United Nations (UN), 
Partnership for Peace (PFP), and the European Union (EU) have become major players in 
the quest for international peace and prosperity.  Additionally, the massive trends toward 
globalization and mass communication in the last recent years have given rise to the 
“international community” and a blurring of national boundaries. 
As a small island state situated on the western periphery of Europe, Ireland has 
made remarkable strides towards embracing the global and multilateral nature of the 
current international scene.  With a population of only 3.6 million people and a small, 
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open economy, Ireland has pursued an ambitious policy of active engagement both 
bilaterally and multilaterally in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and the Americas.  
(“General Principles”)  Its peacekeepers have served in conflicts from Beirut to East 
Timor to Kosovo, and it provides aid and assistance to many third-world countries 
through programs like the Ireland Aid Country Programmes and through EU and UN 
institutions like the European Development Fund, UNICEF (United Nations Children's 
Fund) and UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees).  (“Ireland Aid – 
An Overview”)  In addition to devoting resources, Ireland has used key positions in the 
EU presidency and the UN to champion concerted strategies embracing political, 
peacekeeping, foreign aid, humanitarian and economic dimensions.  (“General 
Principles”) 
Despite being actively involved in various political and non-governmental 
organizations, Ireland has always taken great pride in its policy of military neutrality.  
The Irish history of neutrality has its roots in the long British rule of Ireland and has been 
embraced by the Irish public as a core political value and a counterbalance to the 
powerful economic and political influence of its neighbor since Ireland became an 
independent state in 1922.  The practice of Irish neutrality, however, does not correspond 
to the traditional definition of neutrality. Ireland has consistently favored economic and 
social concerns over a strict adherence to the established duties of a neutral state.  
(Salmon, p.305)  The geopolitical and economic realities of the Irish situation have 
helped Ireland avoid a rigorous test of its commitment to a policy of neutrality in the past.  
In fact, Ireland has used its pragmatic brand of neutrality to help protect its interests while 
expanding its sphere of political, humanitarian and economic activities. 
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Included in Ireland’s expanding sphere of activity is the issue of collective 
security. Ireland is a member of the EU and PFP, although its current policy of neutrality 
precludes it from joining a defense organization like the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) or a similarly militarily aligned organization, such as the Western 
European Union (WEU).  These associations, as well as its membership in the UN, 
contradict the validity of Irish claims of neutrality. 
In this article I will discuss the issues surrounding a valid claim to neutrality and 
the effect of such a claim on Ireland’s current foreign and security policy.  I will examine 
Ireland’s traditional and historical sense of neutrality, its position in the EU, UN and 
other international organizations and how these might influence future foreign policy.  
Even though the problems faced in Northern Ireland are considered as part of Ireland’s 
foreign policy, Britain-Ireland-Northern Ireland dynamics will only be considered in their 
context to other international organizations. 
 
The Concept of Neutrality 
Historically, exercising neutrality has been as much a demonstration of a nation’s 
sovereignty as it has been a commitment to avoid war.  Consequently, since the formation 
of the Irish state, the Irish have used neutrality to demonstrate their independence from 
British rule and influence. The Irish concept and implementation of neutrality have fallen 
short of the traditionally accepted definitions of neutrality, however. 
The concept of absolute neutrality, or the unconditional right not to participate in 
war, emerged in the 18th century as a logical response to the development of a nation’s 
absolute and unconditional right to start wars.  (Karsh, p. 13)  It is important to note that, 
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although the territory of a neutral power is inviolable by international law, it is the 
responsibility of the neutral power to prevent its territory from being violated by warring 
powers.  (Keatinge, 1984, pp. 145-46)  Although neutrality officially only applies during 
a time of hostilities, the traditional Swiss model of neutrality emphasizes important 
differences between neutrality during war and permanent neutrality.  Ordinary neutrality 
carries with it the legal status of not participating in war, while permanent neutrality 
carries peacetime rights and duties.  These include an obligation for the neutral nation to 
not start or join a war but also to have the ability to defend its neutrality and sovereignty.  
Secondary duties require the nation to remain politically, militarily and economically 
neutral by avoiding foreign policies and military and economic agreements that would 
render its neutrality suspect in case of war.  (Keatinge, 1984, pp. 148-49)  In the Irish 
case, neutrality is a self-imposed doctrine, enshrined in neither the Constitution nor other 
international treaties unlike the neutrality policies for more traditional neutral countries 
like Switzerland.  (Salmon, p. 7) 
The other essential aspect of neutrality is the need for complete and absolute 
sovereignty over state and foreign policy.  In order for a nation to be permanently and 
absolutely neutral, it must retain full sovereignty over its foreign policy and political 
autonomy by avoiding binding political or economic agreements.  (Keatinge, 1984, p. 
149)  When looked at in this light, political neutrality requires not only that a nation not 
enter into any security treaties, but that it also avoid making any collective security 
agreements or joining any organizations that might cause the nation to forfeit its 
sovereignty in this manner. 
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Under this model, a nation seeking to operate under a strict blanket of neutrality 
would not join the United Nations, European Union or the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  Any of these organizations could require that a nation 
be drawn into conflict, whether through the imposition of sanctions or through direct 
military action.  Additionally, by joining organizations like the European Union, the 
European Economic Community (EEC) or the European Monetary Union (EMU), a 
nation violates the necessity of control over its political and economic sovereignty.  Since 
sovereignty is a fundamental basis of neutrality, the degree to which a nation maintains 
its “unfettered right to decide to say yes or no” is the degree to which a nation is neutral.  
(Salmon, p. 286) 
Because of its membership in the EU, UN and Partnership for Peace, it is clear 
that Ireland’s current foreign policy does not constitute a permanent or absolutely neutral 
status.  Yet the value of neutrality to the Irish people cannot be understated.  Irish 
politicians have not wasted time using the Irish preoccupation with neutrality as a 
political value.  Whenever neutrality starts being used as a political value, its meaning 
broadens widely and becomes misunderstood, as well as losing all legal or diplomatic 
function.  (Keatinge, 1984, p. 6) 
 
Historical Basis for Irish Neutrality 
Sovereignty through Neutrality – Neutrality during WWII 
The historical basis for the popularity of neutrality among the Irish people is 
important to consider when examining current Irish foreign policy and international 
activities.  Ireland has a long history of being under British rule.  From the Norman 
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invasion of Ireland in 1169 until Irish independence in 1922, Great Britain has held 
dominion over the island.  (Coakley et al., p. 2)  Consequently, after Ireland gained its 
independence it did not want to be under the yoke of its economically and politically 
powerful neighbor.  As Michael Collins put it, the “Irish struggle has always been for 
freedom – freedom from English occupation, English domination.”  (Salmon, p. 83) 
The call for neutrality first came out of the Irish refusal to participate in Great 
Britain’s wars.  In 1918 the British government voted to extend conscription for World 
War I to Ireland, a policy that would have a profound impact on future Irish 
policymaking.  As stated by Irish historian Patrick Keatinge, the decision for conscription 
in Ireland “was to establish significant restrictions on future Irish political leaders faced 
with the issue of some form of military participation in international politics; the popular 
basis of Irish neutrality was enshrined in 1918.”  (Salmon, p. 83) 
The new Irish state formed by the treaty in 1922 could be called anything but 
neutral, however.  Additionally, due to provisions in the 1922 treaty, Britain retained 
control of several strategic port facilities in Ireland.  The mere existence of the British at 
these bases made any credible policy of neutrality impossible.  (Keatinge, 1984, p. 13)  
As Anglo-Irish relations worsened prior to World War II, an agreement was reached in 
1938 for the British to withdraw from their naval positions. 
The British withdrawal from the ports reaffirmed Ireland as sovereign from 
British rule and made Irish neutrality internationally legitimate such that, when World 
War II broke out in 1939, the Irish promptly declared neutrality.  The main reason for 
declaring neutrality was to affirm that Ireland was separate and sovereign from Britain 
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and was not responsible for its wars; Taoiseach de Valera himself emphasized that 
neutrality was an instrumental objective, not a primary purpose.  (Keatinge, 1984, p. 16)   
Because the definition of true neutrality requires a preservation of international 
sovereignty, the realities of the Irish situation must be considered.  Was Ireland truly able 
to defend itself against violations of its territory, against pressure from the British and 
Americans, and the consequent German reaction to perceived violations of its neutrality? 
Ireland was economically dependent upon Great Britain; but in order for its neutrality to 
be respected internationally, Ireland could not compromise the impartiality required of a 
neutral.  Also important was that Ireland did not have a strong enough defense force to 
repel a full invasion.  Although de Valera mobilized the defense, the geographic position 
of Ireland was the largest factor in protecting neutrality.  The military value of the island 
was less than the cost of invasion and thus prevented the Germans, British or Americans 
from violating Irish neutrality for military bases.  (Papacosma et al., p. 108) 
Despite the lack of military violations of its neutrality, Ireland had to be careful to 
avoid the conflict between economic dependency and impartial neutrality.  Absolute 
neutrality would have required that the imminently important Anglo-Irish connection not 
aid the British with their war when the severance of this trade link would have led to the 
destruction of the Irish economy.  Hitler did not seem to be concerned, however, as he 
apparently argued in 1941 that “Eire’s neutrality must be respected.  A neutral Irish Free 
State is of greater value to us than a hostile Ireland.”  (Fisk, p. 226)  The Irish actions 
during World War II clearly indicated a stubbornness to resist major infractions on issues 
related to their core sovereignty, like the ports, but showed a strong bias towards the 
Allies in smaller issues.  Overall, even though World War II has been described as “the 
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most clear-cut manifestation of neutrality in Irish history,” Ireland acted more like a 
militarily non-belligerent than as an economically, military and politically impartial 
neutral.  (Salmon, p. 152) 
Independent flexibility and pragmatism characterized Irish neutrality after the 
war.  Neutrality had affirmed Ireland’s independence and sovereignty from Britain.  
When the question of joining the Marshall Plan and the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation  (OEEC) came up, there was initial opposition.  The opposition 
was not to the economic benefits of the programs, but to the loss of any independence 
and sovereignty that would accompany these benefits.  Ireland did become a member of 
these organizations, however, after it realized that it could not raise its living standards by 
relying on its own economic markets.  (Salmon, p. 173)  This period after the war was 
marked by much debate on the partition and the exercise of independence in the face of 
the new intertwined economies and foreign policies being developed in Europe.  It 
marked a turning point for Irish neutrality, away from neutrality’s use to assert simple 
sovereignty from Britain to a focus on using neutrality to eliminate the partition on the 
island. 
Ireland was on the list of potential members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and was approached to be one of the original signatories and draft 
members of the treaty when it was formed following WWII.  Since NATO would include 
Britain as well as the United States, membership in NATO struck at the very core of 
sovereignty and independence from Britain and participation in its wars.  However, since 
the partition of the island constituted a larger breach of sovereignty, Ireland conditioned 
joining NATO on the resolution of the partition question. The political reaction from the 
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United States that Ireland had hoped to fuel in support of dissolving the partition did not 
materialize, however, so Ireland declined to join NATO.  (Salmon, p. 181) 
The willingness to join NATO and discard neutrality if it resolved the partition 
issue effectively showed that neutrality, as a concept, was not a top priority of the state.  
Additionally, the focus on the partition during the NATO debate illustrated an isolationist 
movement in Ireland in regard to international issues.  Before the 1950’s, Ireland tended 
to pay attention to issues that related to the partition but little else, partly because of the 
insulating effect of Britain and Ireland’s small size and limited interests.  The major 
cause of this isolationist attitude, however, was most likely that the political leadership, a 
majority of whom were left over from the fight for independence, held onto very 
nationalistic ideals.  (Chubb, p. 8) 
Neutrality and the Rise of Multilateral Organizations after World War II 
Having been blocked by Russia from joining until 1955, Ireland’s admission into 
the UN also emphasized a policy shift away from neutrality.  The appearance of this 
policy shift was in official government statements only, as it has been repeatedly stated 
above that Ireland has never been strictly and traditionally neutral.  (Fisk, p. 472) 
The Irish Parliament, known as the Dáil, was fully aware that joining the UN 
could lead to the member states being involved in a war.  Additionally, there was feeling 
that collective security was a higher priority than neutrality.  As de Valera remarked in 
1946, the Irish would have “to face the waging of war in order to prevent war,” because 
collective security required being “prepared to accept some deciding authority other than 
your own will.”  (Salmon, p. 176) 
  
10 
Consequently, when the United Nations asked if Ireland would be willing to 
contribute peacekeepers in 1958, the Irish readily agreed, as the benefits from 
participation in world affairs far outweighed the loss of the ability to be neutral.  Ireland’s 
foreign policy and the realities of its neutrality were summed up for John F. Kennedy 
before he visited Ireland in 1963 by the CIA: “While not in the least neutral to the 
ideological issues involved in the East-West struggle, Ireland pursues today an 
independent course in international affairs.”  (Keogh, p. 251) 
In addition to Ireland’s recognition of the value of collective security, economic 
considerations also became a stronger force than the desire for strict neutrality.  In 1961 
Ireland applied to join the European Economic Community (EEC) and accept the 
consequent loss of sovereignty over a wide range of issues. 
The official Irish policy regarding neutrality in the areas of the UN and EEC was 
somewhat less ambiguous that the public sentiment over the issue.  On one side were 
those who felt that the ability to declare neutrality in time of war was being compromised 
by membership into the EEC and the UN.  On the other side was the promise of 
increasing economic and political benefits.  In 1962 Taoiseach Sean Lemass addressed 
Ireland’s application for membership in the EEC, remarking that: 
We recognise that a military commitment will be an inevitable 
consequence of our joining the Common Market and ultimately we would 
be prepared to yield even the technical label of our neutrality.  We are 
prepared to go into this integrated Europe without any reservations as to 
how far this will take us in the field of foreign policy and defence. 
(Keogh, p. 247) 
Although the EEC rejected its membership in 1962, when Ireland reapplied and 
was admitted in 1969, the debates between neutrality and economics were rekindled.  
Taoiseach Patrick Lynch pointed out that Irish neutrality was not legally binding like the 
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traditional neutrality embraced by Austria, Sweden and Switzerland, that Ireland’s role in 
international organizations like the UN had invalidated its neutrality, and that Ireland had 
never adopted a permanent ideology or doctrine of neutrality.  Neutrality had been 
instilled in the public as a policy for all circumstances during WWII, but now Ireland was 
“on the side of all peace loving countries.”  (Salmon, pp. 220-21) 
Irish participation in the European Union naturally evolved from its membership 
in the EEC; and although issues were raised with each successive treaty with the EU, 
Ireland was definitely not considered neutral.  For example, the Supreme Court decided 
in 1987 that the Single European Act (SEA), one of the main treaties of the EU, violated 
the Irish Constitution by limiting Irish sovereignty and the ability to conduct foreign 
policy.  Consequently, a referendum was held and passed, ratifying the SEA with 69.9 
percent in favor, thus removing all legal basis for neutrality other than the constitutional 
power of the Dáil to declare war.  (Salmon, p. 288) 
As a consequence of the SEA challenge, Irish governments since then have been 
very conscious of the importance of neutrality to the Irish public and have pledged to put 
any change in the Irish foreign security policy to a referendum.  However, this pledge has 
prevented full Irish participation in the formulation of the EU defense and security 
polices, including the formation of the European Rapid Reaction Force. 
 
Multilateral Goals, Multilateral Means  
Ireland is remarkable for its commitment to foreign policy objectives that would 
seem out of the reach of a small nation situated on the fringes of Europe.  Irish foreign 
policy is based on Article 29 in its constitution, which affirms Ireland’s “devotion to the 
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ideal of peace and friendly co-operation founded on international justice and morality” 
and “adherence to the principle of the pacific settlement of international disputes by 
international arbitration or judicial determination.”  (“Ireland in the World”) 
Ireland also realized that foreign policy is a two-way street and that it would have 
to be willing to participate in international affairs if it were to depend on other nations 
through the rules of international law.  Ireland’s commitment to international 
participation is seen through a disproportionately high contribution to peacekeeping, 
foreign aid and international pressure towards arms control and nuclear non-proliferation.  
Irish devotion to international peace and stability, it appears, extends far beyond the 
wording in the constitution.  (Keatinge 1996, p. 121) 
The UN: Peacekeeping, Aid and the Security Council 
As a major instrument of international law and cooperative security, the United 
Nations plays an enormous role in Irish foreign and security policy and provides the 
political and legal legitimacy behind international military operations, specifically the 
deployment of peacekeeping forces.  It is one of the main conduits for Irish foreign aid 
and for promotion of arms control and nuclear non-proliferation. 
Since 1958 over 48,000 Irish soldiers have served in more than 30 different UN 
operations.  The professionalism and conduct of these soldiers has been commended as 
Ireland has gained a reputation of being a fair, just and able contributor to the promotion 
of peace and stability.  Ireland’s peacekeeping reputation is credited as being a major 
factor in the Irish election to the UN Security Council in 2000. (Cowen)  Members of the 
UN showed strong support for Ireland by electing it on the first vote with 130 votes out 
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of 173, which “illustrates the high regard in which Ireland's contribution to the work of 
the UN is held throughout the world.”  (“Ahern Promises…”) 
The substantial margin by which Ireland won the Security Council seat indicates 
how far Ireland has progressed in the world from the time of its entrance into the UN and, 
essentially, from its independence.  It has made substantial gains in its international 
reputation as a promoter of peace and the peaceful conciliation of conflicts.  The 
interesting aspect of these goals of international peace is that Ireland seems to be 
pursuing international influence above and beyond what its national self-interest would 
dictate.  Taking into account its size and largely foreign-dependent economy, such 
international activity would normally be much lower.  Ireland’s objectives during its term 
on the Security Council support a drive towards UN reform, renewal in the UN’s ability 
to accomplish peace and to help make the Security Council become more effective and 
more representative of the entire UN.  (“Taoiseach Welcomes…”) 
The European Union: Road to NATO or Opportunity for Expansion? 
Membership in the European Union has broadened Ireland’s opportunity to 
pursue an active foreign policy and has provided development and structural funding that 
has helped stimulate the Irish economy.  Ireland has used the EU to pursue Irish foreign 
policy aims of peace and international cooperation, especially during Ireland’s turn for 
the Council of Europe presidency in 1996 when the agenda for the Inter-Governmental 
Conference (IGC) was being drafted.  The IGC was designed to look at issues first 
discussed in the Treaty of the European Union (also known as the Maastricht Treaty), 
including the next step in the further development of a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), which will lead to the construction of a European defense force and 
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govern its subsequent use.  The CFSP established the method for the EU to project its 
own international foreign policy and implement a common security policy, rather than 
needing the approval and cooperation of all of the individual member states.  Although a 
common security policy, which defines security objectives, responses and policy goals, is 
not a common defense policy with mutual defense alliances, it is a step in that direction.  
(“Common Foreign…”) 
The security climate in Europe has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold 
War.  This climate has been altered from one with easily defined, nuclear-capable 
opponents to smaller, regional instabilities encompassing a wide range of international 
issues from human rights violations to refugees to all-out war.  As can be seen by the 
recent NATO intervention in the Kosovo conflict, a modern security policy must be able 
to accomplish a wide variety of missions.  Specifically, the Amsterdam Treaty, signed in 
1999, outlines various tasks as important for EU security.  These tasks include 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and combat-force operations in crisis 
management, which includes peacemaking, defined as using force to stop a current 
conflict.  The CFSP set up a method for the EU to project policy internationally on the 
types of missions described above and eventually formulate a common defense policy, 
defining the nature of the military alliances between the nations in the EU and outside of 
the EU.  (“Common Foreign…”) 
After the CFSP’s implementation in 1999, the EU started to look into the 
formation of its own crisis management force called the European Rapid Reaction Force 
(ERRF).  The ERRF would have the capabilities to respond to regional conflicts more 
quickly and with a military response similar to the abilities of NATO and greater than 
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those of the UN.  (“Analysis – Problems…”)  The existence of a force like the ERRF 
raises questions that Ireland could be drawn into a mutual defense guarantee for nations 
in the EU. 
A mutual defense guarantee and rapidly deployable force like the ERRF is the 
type of policy that is seen to be leading Ireland directly into NATO.  Historically, Ireland 
rejected NATO membership because of the partition issue and the desire to assert its 
independence from British influence.  This argument developed into the concept of 
military neutrality that is currently embraced by the Irish public.  Additionally, Ireland’s 
strong stance towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament provides a compelling 
argument against entering or associating with NATO, which still considers nuclear 
weapons deterrence an acceptable strategy. 
The Partnership for Peace (PFP) was formed when the Soviet Union dissolved 
and NATO recognized the need to embrace collective action in peacekeeping and 
peacemaking situations rather than being simply a Soviet deterrent. Participation in any 
military action is strictly voluntary for its members.  Most other European states 
recognized the new security environment in Europe and joined the PFP as a method of 
integrating the command and implementation structures of their respective militaries.  
Even Switzerland joined in 1996, despite its strict and still standing policy of permanent 
neutrality.  (“Partnership... ,” NATO) 
The Irish debate surrounding membership in the PFP was based upon the 
objections that joining it would lead Ireland into NATO and thus violate Irish neutrality, 
destroy its credibility as an international mediator, and lead it towards endorsing nuclear 
weapons.  It seems that these reasons were built upon old Cold War realities as opposed 
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to the new security environment currently facing Ireland and the rest of Europe.  
(Keatinge, 1996)  Consequently, Ireland was one of the last nations to join the PFP in 
1999, four to five years after most of the earlier countries.  (“Partnership... ,” NATO) 
Adapting to the new realpolitik will be the challenge facing Ireland’s future 
security policy.  Ireland already lags behind the rest of the European countries, NATO 
and the WEU in terms of the military and political integration necessary to operate and 
contribute to multinational operations and needs to quickly adapt if it is going to continue 
its international growth and influence in Europe.  (Gillespie) 
Ireland’s goal of becoming a larger player in international mediation and 
stabilization requires multilateral participation in military operations.  While the view that 
joining a military alliance promotes militarism and destabilization might have been true 
before and during the Cold War, the recent organizations formed to combat current 
security threats seem to allow member states to retain the decision to participate in 
military action and thus their sovereignty.  (“Andrews Moves…”) 
The basic question seems to be whether or not the seemingly mythical status of 
Irish neutrality with the Irish public will limit Ireland’s involvement in the security 
environment and issues facing the EU.  Neutrality is certainly an issue with some of the 
Irish public and political parties, but the question is to what extent neutrality will hamper 
Ireland’s ability to participate in the new cooperative security regimes facing Europe. 
The Future of Irish Foreign Policy and International Participation 
Participation in PFP and the evolution of the CFSP have increased the multilateral 
influence in crisis management, and Ireland has found its delay in fully embracing these 
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organizations detrimental to its peacekeeping abilities and multilateral military 
integration.  (Gillespie) 
Ireland’s commendable UN contributions and experience give it a strong 
reputation that, when coupled with its experience as a neutral small state and aspirations 
of peaceful conflict prevention, justice and international law, provide a strong attraction 
for support from other UN and international states.  Additionally, Ireland has taken great 
pride in its military neutrality and stance against nuclear weapons.  Until recently, public 
opinion held that these values would be compromised by joining multilateral military 
organizations.  (“Ireland and the Partnership…”)  However, the contention that this 
reputation will be tarnished by participation in the ERRF or the PFP is not necessarily 
true, as other states recognize the importance and multilateral necessity of these 
organizations, as shown by their advocacy and involvement in these organizations.  
(“Taoiseach Speaks…”) 
The benefits of having a defense policy that is headed towards greater integration 
with multilateral organizations are numerous, from increased military development with 
other nations to greater influence in helping resolve conflicts such as Kosovo that require 
a multilateral approach. 
Future Irish policy must take into account the changes in the security environment 
and must examine how Ireland can contribute best to preventative and protective 
collective security.  International and multilateral organizations will play a big part in the 
future security and political environment, and Ireland has enormous experience working 
in those organizations.  (“Partnership…,” Department of Foreign Affairs)  The question 
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now is whether Ireland will engage those newly developed organizations or watch them 
passively from the outside. 
 
Conclusion 
The constantly evolving European and international security environment has 
forced Ireland to reformulate and adapt its security and defense policy.  Since it first 
declared a policy of neutrality and enshrined the promotion of peace, international justice 
and cooperation in its constitution, Ireland has been supportive of collective security and 
defense as a means to resolve and prevent conflicts.  Because of its past experiences 
under British rule, Ireland has historically embraced military neutrality as a method of 
maintaining its sovereignty.  As the benefits of joining the UN and EU became clear, 
however, Irish neutrality has evolved so that its implementation did not prohibit Ireland’s 
entrance into these organizations.  Neutrality is now “military” neutrality and means 
simply that Ireland is not a member of a traditional military alliance. 
The future international security environment requires a flexible adaptive policy 
based upon a multilateral response to crises and multilateral preventative policies to avoid 
crises.  Although Irish adoption of such a policy, especially with regard to the Partnership 
for Peace, NATO, EU, and the ERRF, seems to some of the Irish public that it is 
destroying any concept of neutrality, the formulation of such a policy would actually 
strengthen and promote the ideals to which Ireland has been committed since it gained its 
independence.  Through all of its efforts in the UN, peacekeeping, work on disarmament 
and nuclear non-proliferation, Ireland has been a model of international participation and 
engagement in international peace and justice.  Neutrality has never prevented Ireland 
  
19 
from joining the organizations necessary for it to achieve those goals and is not likely to 
do so in the future. 
Ireland is positioned to provide a meaningful contribution to the goals of 
international peace as it starts its term on the UN Security Council and as it participates in 
the development of EU defense policies.  How the ideal of neutrality will affect Ireland’s 
ability to pursue these goals remains to be seen and is an important issue for Ireland to 
focus on as it begins to adapt to the constantly changing international security 
environment. 
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